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CASE COMMENTS

section 7 was not the mere substitution of a large, powerful firm
for a smaller one with a dominant share of a different product market;
the "salient characteristic" which gave rise to probable ant-competitive effects was the close relationship of the products. Yet the court,
in dismissing the complaint, gave as the reason for its decision its refusal to enunciate a per se rule based on size alone.
In effect, the Court of Appeals appears to have drawn a legal
distinction between conglomerate mergers and horizontal mergers. Its
reasoning seems to be based on a consideration of conglomerate mergers as a distinct legal category. As viewed by the court, the Federal
Trade Commission, by characterizing this merger as conglomerate, has
precluded itself from making any effective arguments as to horizontal
implications.
Procter & Gamble will be heard by the United States Supreme
Court in the current term.69 Thus, the Court will have an opportunity
to make clear what was not made clear in Consolidated Foods and
Continental Can: Does the term conglomerate merger denote a separate
legal classification; or is it merely a convenient economic frame of
reference?
WILLIAM PRICE TEDARDS, JR.

FAILURE OF INSURED TO ATTEND TRIAL AS BREACH
OF COOPERATION CLAUSE
Today's automobile liability insurance policy contains a standard
cooperation clause,1 a means to secure the insured's cooperation in
defending any claim that may arise under the policy. The company
may avoid liability if the insured fails to comply with the condition.
When an insured has failed to appear at a scheduled trial, in which
his insurance company is defending him, the cooperation clause often
becomes a critical issue.
Farley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch.2 illustrates the operation of the cooperation clause when invoked by an insurance company against a
third-party claimant. Farley, an Idaho resident, and the insured, a
69
Procter & Gamble v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S.
897 (1966).
1The clause in the principal case was as follows: "The insured shall cooperate
with the Exchange and, upon the Exchange's request, shall attend hearings and
trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of any legal proceedings in
connection with the subject matter of this insurance." Farley v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch., 415 P.2d 680, 681 (Idaho 1966). (Emphasis added.)
2415 P.2d 680 (Idaho 1966).
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resident of Idaho employed in Nevada, were involved in an automobile accident in Idaho. The insured notified the insurance company of
the facts of the accident. After consultation with the company's attorneys on a number of occasions, the insured agreed to appear at
the trial and to come a few days in advance so that he could prepare
for the trial with the company's defense counsel.
On the day of the trial there was a snow storm, and the court
assumed that the insured was late because of the weather. However,
at the end of the plaintiff's evidence the insured had not appeared,
and the defense notified the plaintiff that the company was reserving
its rights under the cooperation clause if it was later shown that the
insured had voluntarily failed to attend trial. The trial resulted in a
verdict of $6,859 for the plaintiff.
Eight months after the trial the defendant company located the
insured in Lockport, New York, and obtained a statement from him
that he voluntarily left his Nevada employ two days before the trial
and went directly to New York.
When Farley sued the insurance company on the judgment, the
company denied liability, relying on a breach of the cooperation
clause as an affirmative defense. The trial court, finding that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the failure of its insured to appear
at the first trial, rejected this defense and entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed, saying, "We prefer the
modern view which requires the insurance company to prove prejudice without the benefit of a presumption." 3 The court reasoned
that the burden of proving prejudice was upon the insurance companyt and would not aid the company by granting it the benefit of a
presumption of prejudice.
The court held that although it may be difficult for the insurer to
prove prejudice it would be more difficult for the plaintiff to prove
lack of prejudice, which would involve proving a negative. Therefore,
such a presumption conflicts with "the public policy of this state to
secure compensation to the injured victims of negligent drivers," 5 be31d. at 684 (Emphasis added.)

4To reach this conclusion, the court relied on its opinion in Leach v. Farmer's
Auto. Interinsurance Exch., 70 Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 920 (1950), where it had earlier
ruled on the need to show prejudice. This case, though dealing with a cooperation clause and breach thereof, does not deal with a failure to attend trial. The
breach in this case was a failure to give written notice in a reasonable time, although oral notice was promptly given.
5415 P.2d at 684.
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cause it throws the onus of proving a lack of prejudice on the plaintiff. Applying these principles, the court found that the company
had failed to prove it was prejudiced.
Most courts today agree that it is incumbent upon the insurance
company to show that the insured wilfully breached the cooperation
clause in a substantial and material way.6 The courts also agree that
there is no breach if there is reasonable excuse for the absence. Once
the question of whether the breach was wilful and not based on any
reasonable excuse is decided, the court must then consider whether it
is substantial" or material9 and whether the insurer has used proper
diligence in attempting to bring the insured to trial. 10
There are three approaches to the problem of determining whether
the breach is substantial or material: the proof of prejudice rule;
the prejudice per se rule; and the presumption of prejudice rule.
The first approach is the proof of prejudice rule, under which the
insurer must prove that the failure of the insured to be in court has
substantially prejudiced its defense of the case." The proof of this
6
See
7

generally 60 A.L.R.2d § 3(a) at 1150.
Failure to appear was excused where the insured feared his job would be
jeopardized if he attended, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 237 F.2d
887 (9th Cit. 1956); and where the insured failed to appear because of an honest
mistake as to the date of the trial, Pawlik v. Nichols, 195 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Ill.
1961). However, the court in Daly v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 269 Mass.
1, 168 N.E. 111 (1929), held it a breach when the insured claimed nonappearance
due to work, since the employer would have consented to his absence.
8
BLAcK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951), defines substantial as "of real worth
and importance"; and says that substantial performance "exists where there has
been no willful departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission in
essential points, and the contract has been honestly and faithfully performed...."
9
BLACK, LAW DICIONARY (4th ed. 1951) defines material as "having influence or
effect."
10State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 238 Ore. 285, 387 P.2d
825 (1963); Johnson v. Doughty, 236 Ore. 78, 385 P.2d 760 (1963); Kraynick v.
Nationwide Ins. Co, 72 N.J. Super. 34, 178 A.2d 50 (1962).
lThe court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Koval, 146 F.2d 118, 120
(10th Cir. 1944) gives a general statement of the proof of prejudice rule:
Under the weight of authority, to constitute a breach of a cooperation
clause by the insured, there must be a lack of cooperation in some substantial and material respect that results in prejudice to the insurer; whether there
has been such a breach is a question of fact; and such a breach is an affirmative
defense, the burden of establishing which rests on the insurer.
Roberts v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 363 (W.D. Ark. 1956);
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Vliet, 148 Fla. 568, 4 So. 2d 862 (1941); Jameson v.
Farmer's Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 120, 309 P.2d 394 (1957); Allen v. Cheatum,
351 Mich. 585, 88 N.W.2d 306 (1958); White v. Boulton, 259 Minn. 325, 107
N.W.2d 370 (1961); Johnson v. Doughty, 236 Ore. 78, 385 P.2d 760 (1963); Oberhansly v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093 (1956); Fulkerson v.
Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 150 F. Supp. 663 (D. Wyo. 1957).
Accord, Campbell v. Allstate, 60 Cal. 2d 303, 32 Cal, Rptr. 827 (1963) (failure
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prejudice is usually a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
Several reasons are advanced in support of the rule. One is that the
appearance of an insured in court is not always beneficial to the
insurance company because of the insured's potentially disastrous
testimony.' 2 Also, insurance companies may tend to use the failure of
the insured to appear at trial as an easy escape from a case of clear
3
liability.'
Underlying the use of the substantial prejudice doctrine is the
theory that liability insurance contracts are partially third party beneficiary contracts to be enforced in the public interest for the protection of innocent victims.14 The primary motive here is the desire to
protect the injured. Of the three parties involved, the insured, the
disclaiming insurer, and the injured plaintiff, the insurer should be the
prime candidate to bear the loss.
The danger in the rule is that if "carried to the point of imposing an
almost insurmountable burden of proving that the verdict was the result of the lack of cooperation, it would amount to a perversion of
such contractual provision." 15
The second approach, at the other end of the spectrum, is the
prejudice per sel' rule. The rule requires only that the insurer prove
of insured to communicate with insurer after receipt of summons); American
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collura, 163 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1964) (insured made voluntary
submission to service of process); Leach v. Farmer's Auto. Interinsurance Exch.,
70 Idaho 156, 213 P.2d 920 (1950) (failure to give written notice although oral
notice was given); Bernard v. Hungerford, 157 So. 2d 246 (La. Ct. App. 1963)
(insured charged with collusion); Schmittinger v. Grogan, 402 Pa. 499, 166
A.2d 524 (1961) (insured failed to cooperate in trial defense); Tierney v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 216 F. Supp. 590 (D. Ore. 1963) (applying Washington law) (insured
gave false information); Steppich v. Morrison, 12 Wis. 2d 331, 107 N.W.2d 125
(1961)
(failure of insured to send summons).
12 White v. Boulton, 259 Minn. 325, 107 N.W.2d 370, 372 (1961).
3
1 Allen v. Cheatum, 351 Mich. 585, 88 N.W.2d 306, 312 (1958). The court discusses the temptation for some companies to subtly encourage "certain of their
less desirable risks to 'get lost' and stay lost while at the same time building a
plausible if perfunctory record for an ultimate claim of noncooperation." However, it is pointed out in Jameson v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 120,
309 P.2d 394, 400 (1957), that collusion works both ways, and the insured and
plaintiff might join together to defraud the insurer.
14jameson v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 181 Kan. 120, 309 P.2d 394, 399
(1957); 8 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4784 (1962). But see Maryland Gas. Co. v. Hallatt, 295 F.2d 64, 70 (5th Cir. 1961), where the court points
out that although insurance contracts are to be liberally construed they still
must be subject to rules of construction and language applied to other contracts.
158 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4773, at 103-09 (1962).
16
1n Potomac Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 381 F.2d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 1960), the court
presents the prejudice per se rule as the majority view:
We think the majority view, that the failure of an insured person to attend
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the insured has intentionally failed to appear at a scheduled trial without good reason, the company having exercised diligence' 7 in attempting to secure the insured's cooperation. When the insurer has succeeded in proving these facts, it will have shown the court that the
failure of the insured to appear constitutes a wilful breach of the cooperation clause and will have established prejudice as a matter of
law.
The reason for this approach was given in Polito v. Galluzzo:' s
What that verdict would have been if the insured had attended
the trial and testified was a matter of conjecture and surmise; but
nevertheless, the insurer was wrongfully deprived of whatever
benefit it might have derived from his testimony. 9
The third approach, the presumption of prejudice rule,20 is a
a trial and aid in the defense when a case against him is called for trial, is
per se prejudicial, is consistent with the established principle of Indiana law
that one who would seek to enforce a contract for his benefit must show that
he has performed all conditions on his part required to be performed as a
condition precedent to his right.
Curran v. Connecticut Indem. Co., 127 Conn. 692, 20 A.2d 87 (1941); Schneider v.
Autoist Mu. Ins. Co., 346 I11.137, 178 N.E. 466 (1933); Beam v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1959); Polito v. Galluzzo, 337 Mass. 360, 149
N.E.2d 375 (1958); Lenhart v. Rich, 384 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1964); Glens Falls
lndemn. Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 At. 473 (1936); Kraynick v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 72 N.J. Super. 34, 178 A.2d 50 (1962).
Accord, Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 207 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1953) (failure
to give truthful disclosure of information); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606 (1950) (failure to give notice-condition precedent
only). Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 NE. 367 (1928)
(insured would not give frank disclosure of information); Jamison v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 36 Tenn. App. 267, 254 S.W.2d 353 (1952) (failure to give notice);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford A & 1, 50 Wash. 2d 443, 313 P.2d 347 (1957)
(failure to send summons-for conditions precedent only); Ragland v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 146 W. Va. 403, 120 S.E.2d 482 (1961) (failure to give timely notice).
Some states make a distinction in using the prejudice per se rule when there
is a condition precedent only. For a discussion of condition precedent and subsequent in an insurance contract see Houran v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 109 Vt.
258, 195 Atl. 253 (1937).
17Supra note 10.
1s337 Mass. 360, 149 N.E.2d 375 (1958).
19149 N.E.2d at 378.
20"That the insurer bears the burden of proving such breach does not alter or
destroy the obligation of the opposing party to meet evidence which standing
alone makes such prima facie defense." Shalita v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 266
App. Div. 131, 41 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (1943).
Formerly the accepted rule in the lower California courts had been the presumption of prejudice rule as represented in Margellini v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co.,
33 Cal. App. 2d 93, 91 P.2d 136 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939); but this was overturned by
the California Supreme Court in Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 32
Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
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middleground between the proof of prejudice rule and the prejudice
per se rule. 21 Under this rule, when the insurance company has proven
a wilful failure to attend trial by the insured, without reasonable
excuse, a presumption arises that its defense has been prejudiced by
such non-cooperation. However, this presumption is not conclusive,
and the claimant may rebut it.
This is probably the better rule, since the insurer does not have
the onus of proving that the injured person could not have possibly recovered had cooperation been rendered; yet in those cases
'where lack of co-operation was not22 of decisive importance, the
injured could rebut the presumption.
The rationale underlying the presumption of prejudice view is
that it is extremely difficult, but not impossible, to defend a case
without the defendant who is usually the chief witness. Insurance
companies spend time and money investigating a case and appraising
its value to the claimant and the company. One of the duties of a claims
adjustor is to evaluate the insured as a potential witness at trial. " : Before going to trial an insurance company will have evaluated the reliability of the insured and his testimony.
The very fact that the defendant has not appeared in court and
the plaintiff has, can only have an adverse effect on the defense's case.
Every person familiar with the trial of cases by jury Imows that
the case of an individual defendant is seriously, if not hopelessly,
prejudiced by his absence from the trial. Such absence, if not
adequately explained, is a circumstance, "chiefly persuasive as distinguished from probative in its effect ... " which normally affects the decision of the jury upon all questions submitted to
them. Even if the liability of a defendant were admitted or conclusively established, it cannot be doubted that the mental attitude
of the jury in assessing damages 'would be influenced by his unex24
plained absence from the courtroom.
21

1n Farley, the court cites Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229, 7 A.2d 293, 296

(1938) as applying the presumption of prejudice rule when in fact the court
found a breach as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Schmittinger v. Grogan, 402 Pa. 499, 166 A.2d 524 (1961) cites Cameron in support of its view that the insurance company has the burden of showing substantial
prejudice and makes no mention of giving a presumption of prejudice.
228 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4773 at 110. (Emphasis added.)
23

See generally, LONG & GREG, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE HANDBOOK

714, 720, 1202-03 (1965); MAGEE & BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 124-31 (7th
ed.241964).
Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 At]. 473, 476-77 (1936).
(Emphasis added.)

